There\u27s No Such Thing as a Political Question of Statutory Interpretation: The Implications of Zivotofsky v. Clinton by Michel, Chris
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
COMMENT
There's No Such Thing as a Political Question of
Statutory Interpretation: The Implications of
Zivotofsky v. Clinton
The political question doctrine poses a paradox. Courts increasingly
dismiss claims as political questions, especially in sensitive fields like foreign
affairs and national security.' Yet the principles underlying the doctrine remain
"murky and unsettled,"2 an "enigma" to courts and commentators alike.' One
scholar famously questioned whether political questions even exist.4
The Supreme Court recently offered a partial answer. In Zivotofsky ex rel.
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the Court held - in contrast to two lower courts - that a
claim under a statute entitling American passport holders born in Jerusalem to
designate their birthplace as "Israel" did not constitute a political question.s
1. See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3 d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2oo) (en
banc); Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 571 F-3d 1227, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 2009), rev'd sub nom.
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012); Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503
F.3d 974 ( 9 th Cir. 2007); Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F-3d 427 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Schneider
v. Kissinger, 412 F.3 d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National
Security Canon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1321 (2012) (observing an expansion in use of the
political question doctrine after September 11, 2001); Note, Developments in the Law-Access
to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1193-98 (2009) [hereinafter Access to Courts] (noting
increasing judicial abstention in foreign affairs cases).
2. Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F-3d 413, 418 (D.C. Cit. 2008) (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 803 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring)).
3. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the 'Political Question,' 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031, 1031
(1985).
4. Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
5. 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012). The statute created controversy because United States policy does not
recognize Jerusalem as part of Israel. Id. at 1425; see infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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The few commentators who have discussed Zivotofsky have urged a narrow
reading.6 This Comment argues instead that the case supports a sweeping and
significant rule: a claim to a federal statutory right can never present a political
question.
Part I probes the definition of political questions and the function of
statutes in the doctrine. Part II analyzes the Court's reasoning in Zivotofsky.
Part III extends that reasoning to establish the principle that statutory claims
can never present political questions. While lower court judges suggested
partial versions of this position before Zivotofsky, 7 this Comment marks the
first attempt to apply the argument to all statutory cases. I conclude that a rule
against statutory political questions injects needed doctrinal clarity and
vindicates fundamental values of separation of powers, access to courts, and
executive compliance with the law.
I. THE ROLE OF STATUTES IN THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
The political question doctrine debuted in Marbury v. Madison.8 Chief
Justice Marshall explained that when "the executive possesses a constitutional
or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are
only politically examinable." 9 One quintessential area of presidential discretion
is the appointment of judicial officers, such as William Marbury.'o Yet the
Court declined to dismiss Marbury's claim as a political question. The reason
6. See The Supreme Court 2o1 Term-Leading Cases, 126 HARv. L. REV. 307, 311 (2012)
[hereinafter Leading Cases]; Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Enabling a Constitutional
Fight, ScoTusBLOG (Mar. 26, 2012, 6:oo PM), http://www.scotusblog.conV?p=1418O4.
7. See Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 61o F.3d 84, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (statement of
Edwards, J.); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 852 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 571 F-3d 1227, 1231
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (Edwards, J., concurring), rev'd sub nom. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v.
Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).
B. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL
ANSWERs: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 3, 10 (1992) (discussing the
doctrine's origins in Marbury).
9. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.
1o. President Adams appointed Marbury to be a Justice of the Peace. Id. at 167. For background
on the position of Justice of the Peace, see David F. Forte, Marbury's Travail: Federalist
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was that Congress had enacted a statute restricting the President's discretion
by entitling Justices of the Peace to "continue in office for five years."" Thus,
an executive act that would have presented a political question in the absence of
a statute became judicially reviewable in the presence of a statute.
Statutory constraints on the executive also proved decisive in other early
cases." By contrast, no case in which the Court recognized a political question
stemmed from a statute. Political questions arose only from constitutional or
common law challenges to actions within the unquestioned discretion of a
political branch, such as the President's recognition of a foreign government.13
Modern political questions have coalesced into two primary categories.14
First, courts will not adjudicate claims arising from "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department."' 5
The Court has applied this principle to claims under the Republican Guarantee
Clause,"' the Impeachment Trial Clause, 7 and, in dicta, Congress's power to
examine the qualifications of its members.'" Second, courts will not adjudicate
claims that present "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
n. Marbuty, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 154.
12. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 129 (1814) (holding that a congressional
declaration of war did not authorize the executive to seize enemy property in the United
States); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177 (1804) (rejecting the Navy Secretary's
authorization of a military vessel seizure in defiance of an implied congressional
prohibition); see CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMrrH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 56-58
(3d ed. 2009) (assessing early political question cases).
13. See United States v. Palmer 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 61o, 634 (1818); see also Williams v. Suffolk
Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839) (determination of a foreign nation's sovereignty);
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 308-13 (1829) (determination of territorial
boundaries).
14. For detailed histories of the political question doctrine, see FRANCK, supra note 8; Rachel E.
Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of
Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237 (2002); Henkin, supra note 4; Redish, supra note
3; and Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 453 (2004).
15. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, S 4; see Colegrove v. Green 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (drawing of
congressional districts by Illinois state legislature); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849) (recognition of state government following the Dorr Rebellion).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 3, cl. 6; see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 5, cl. 1; see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 n.42 (1969).
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standards." 9 The Court has invoked this rationale to dismiss suits challenging
a state's procedures for ratifying a constitutional amendmento and seeking to
establish protocols for the National Guard." But in no case has the Supreme
Court ever found a political question arising from a statutory claim.
By contrast, lower federal courts have increasingly embraced statutory
political questions, 2  especially as statutory claims against the executive
multiplied after September n1, 2001.2 This approach has provoked some
disagreement, most notably a concurring opinion by Judge Kavanaugh
denouncing the D.C. Circuit's invocation of the political question doctrine in a
statutory case involving the Clinton Administration's bombing of a
ig. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. The Baker Court suggested four other possible rationales for political
questions, see id., but the Supreme Court's recent political question opinions, including
Zivotofsky, seem to have narrowed the list to the two rationales outlined here. See Zivotofsky
ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) (quoting Nixon, 5o6 U.S. at 228); see
also Barkow, supra note 14, at 267-73 (noting the apparent narrowing of the doctrine to the
first two Baker factors).
20. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939) ("[T]hese conditions are appropriate for the
consideration of the political departments of the Government. The questions they involve
are essentially political and not justiciable.").
21. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
22. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F-3d 836, 856 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) ("The Supreme Court has never applied the political
question doctrine in a case involving alleged statutory violations. Never."); see also Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230-33 (1986) (declining to hold a
particular statutory claim a political question); Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (construing a statute to avoid finding a political question).
23. See, e.g., Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 632 F. 3d 938 (5th Cir. 2011); El-Shifa,
607 F.3d at 836; Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 571 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2009), rev'd sub nom.
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012); Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503
F-3 d 974 (9 th Cir. 2007); Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3 d 427 (D.C. Cir. 20o6); Schneider
v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Aktepe v. United States, 105 F.3d 1400 (1ith Cir.
1997). The D.C. Circuit is heavily represented in this sample because it hears a
disproportionate number of statutory cases against the federal government. See Recent Case,
El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 640, 640 (2010)
[hereinafter Recent Case] ("The D.C. Circuit frequently encounters cases implicating
decisions of the political branches, and thus its political question jurisprudence is
particularly important in managing the separation of powers.").
24. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb -
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Orzginal Understanding, 121 HARv. L. REV. 689, 693-94
(20o8); see also sources cited supra note 1.
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pharmaceutical factory in Sudan.2 s Yet the trend has persisted. 6 Scholars have
nonetheless largely avoided the issue of statutory political questions, focusing
instead on broader puzzles about the doctrine's scope. 7 Two recent casebooks
ask rhetorically whether the doctrine applies to statutory claims," but no
answer arrived -until Zivotofsky reached the Supreme Court.
II. CLARIFYING THE DOCTRINE: ZIVOTOFSKY V. CLINTON
Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky's unlikely role in the political question
drama began on October 17, 2002, when he was born to American-citizen
parents in a Jerusalem hospital.2 9 Three weeks earlier, Congress had passed a
law providing that "[f]or purposes of the. . . issuance of a passport of a United
States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary of State shall, upon
the request of the citizen or the citizen's legal guardian, record the place of
birth as Israel." 0 This statutory directive contradicted official State
Department policy that Jerusalem's status remains unresolved. President Bush
signed the bill but declined to enforce the provision, section 214 (d), because it
2s. See El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 855-58 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (criticizing the "backdoor use of
the political question doctrine, which may sub silentio expand executive power in an indirect,
haphazard, and unprincipled manner"); see also Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 61o F.3d 84, 87-
88 (D.C. Cir. 2o1o) (en banc) (statement of Edwards, J.) (arguing against the statutory
political question in the case at hand, but suggesting that one might exist in other cases);
Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1233 (Edwards, J., concurring) (same).
26. See Recent Case, supra note 23, at 646 (noting "a broader trend of increasing judicial
deference to the executive branch" through courts' use of the political question doctrine);
Viadeck, supra note 1, at 1321.
27. Compare LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15 (1958), and Alexander M. Bickel, The
Supreme Court 196o Term Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1961) (arguing
for flexible, prudential application of the doctrine), with Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of
the "Passive Virtues," 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964), and Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959) (advocating a narrow doctrine
grounded in constitutional text). For more recent perspectives on this fundamental debate,
see sources cited supra note 14.
2s. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 244 (6th ed. 2009); THOMAS M. FRANCK ET AL., FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
NATIONAL SECURITY LAw 872 (4th ed. 2012).
29. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1425 (2012).
3o. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, S 214 (d), 116
Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002).
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would "impermissibly interfere with the President's constitutional authority to
... determine the terms on which recognition is given to foreign states." 31
Zivotofsky's parents sued to enforce his statutory rights. The district court
accepted the government's argument that the claim presented a political
question, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.3' Applying the "textual commitment"
branch of the doctrine, the court of appeals explained that "[t]he President's
exercise of the recognition power granted solely to him by the Constitution
cannot be reviewed by the courts."33 The court noted that "[w]e have never
relied on the presence or absence of a statutory challenge in deciding whether
the political question doctrine applies," and concluded that "Zivotofsky's claim
presents a nonjusticiable political question because it trenches upon the
constitutionally committed recognition power."34 In a concurring opinion,
Judge Edwards disagreed with the political question rationale and argued that
the court should invalidate the statute on the merits. 35
The Supreme Court reversed, holding by an eight-to-one margin that
Zivotofsky's statutory claim did not present a political question."6 Chief Justice
Roberts's opinion pointedly explained that the "existence of a statutory right
. . . is certainly relevant to the Judiciary's power to decide Zivotofsky's claims,"
and chided the D.C. Circuit for "not even mention[ing] § 214 (d) until the fifth
of its six paragraphs of analysis."37 Because neither party disputed the
interpretation of the statute, "the only real question for the courts [was]
whether the statute is constitutional " Because the lower courts had not
31. Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 38 WEEKLY
ComP. PREs. Doc. 1658, 1659 (Sept. 30, 2002).
32. Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 571 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2009), affg 511 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C.
2007).
33. Id. at 1231. The Eleventh Circuit issued a similar statement in finding a statutory political
question. See Aktepe v. United States, 105 F.3d 1400, 1402 (1ith Cir. 1997) ("The
justiciability of a controversy depends not upon the existence of a federal statute, but upon
whether judicial resolution of that controversy would be consonant with the separation of
powers principles embodied in the Constitution.").
34. Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1232.
3s. Id. at 1233 (Edwards, J., concurring).
36. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012).
37. Id. at 1427.
38. Id. at 1424.
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answered this question, the Court remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit.39 (A
year later, the court of appeals held § 214 (d) unconstitutional on the merits.40)
The Court never stated categorically that statutory claims could not present
political questions. But Justices Sotomayor and Alito felt obliged to write
separate opinions clarifying their view that, in Justice Alito's words,
"determining the constitutionality of an Act of Congress may present a political
question" in some cases.4 1 Justice Breyer's solo dissent would have found a
political question in Zivotofsky based on "prudential considerations" including
the sensitivity of Middle East diplomacy and the Court's lack of foreign policy
expertise.42
III. THE RULE AGAINST STATUTORY POLITICAL QUESTIONS
Given the controversial legal and political issues at stake, Zivotofsky
generated surprisingly little attention.43 The limited commentary has rejected a
reading that makes "an entire category of cases" based on statutory claims
"inherently justiciable."" But the Court's reasoning supports this broader
result. Moreover, rejecting statutory political questions squares with
39. Id. at 1431.
40. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, No. 07-5347, 2013 WL 3799663 (D.C. Cir. July
23, 2013). For an insightful perspective on the merits decision, see Jack Goldsmith, Quick
Reaction to CADC's Analysis in Zivotofsky, LAwFARE (July 24, 2013, 6:o8 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2o13/o7/quick-reaction-to-cadcs-analysis-in-zivotofsky.
41. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1436 (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. at 1435 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) ("It is not impossible to imagine a case involving the application or even the
constitutionality of an enactment that would present a nonjusticiable issue.").
42. Id. at 1437-41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
43. One explanation for the lack of attention may be that the Court released Zivotofsky on the
same day that it heard oral argument on the Affordable Care Act. See, e.g., Peter Spiro, In
Other Supreme Court News: Political Question Doctrine Takes a Hit in Jerusalem Passport Case,
OPINIo JURIs (Mar. 26, 2012, 11:49 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2o12/03/26/in-other
-supreme-court-news-political-question-doctrine-takes-a-hit-in-jerusalem-passport-case
("Too bad the decision comes out today-with the Supreme Court beat otherwise occupied,
I wonder if it will get more than a blip in tomorrow's papers."). Another explanation is that
the Court remanded on the controversial merits question, see supra text accompanying note
39, which may have conveyed the impression of a narrow procedural ruling. Finally,
commentators may resist the argument that Zivotofsky precludes all statutory political
questions, both because the Court failed to articulate a bright-line rule and because norms of
judicial deference to executive expertise in national security cases have grown so ingrained
that Zivotofsky can be dismissed as a mere outlier. See Vladeck, supra note 1, at 1329-30.
44. Leading Cases, supra note 6, at 311.
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longstanding doctrine, vindicates structural separation of powers principles,
and advances prudential considerations like access to courts and clarity of the
law. This Part thus contends that the rule against statutory political questions
should be recognized as the law of the land.
A. Preserving Doctrinal Consistency
As noted in Part I, the Supreme Court has never found a statutory political
question. Zivotofsky shows why this doctrinal consistency is not a coincidence
but rather a necessary rule of federal jurisdiction. The Court's opinion
reiterated the two rationales for political questions: a "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment" of constitutional power to one of the political
branches, and "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards" to
resolve a case. 45 The textual commitment prong cannot apply to a statutory
claim because, as the Court explained, "there is . . . no exclusive commitment
to the Executive of the power to determine the constitutionality of a statute."41
Similarly, the judicially manageable standards prong does not apply because
federal courts have developed the "familiar principles of constitutional
interpretation" and statutory interpretation needed to resolve statutory cases.47
While the Court appropriately limited its holding to the case before it,
these principles apply with equal force to all statutory claims. Thus, courts
cannot invoke either branch of the political question doctrine without
contradicting Zivotofsky's reasoning. This clarification of the doctrine may force
significant shifts in the lower courts, which-with rare exceptions like the
separate opinions by Judges Edwards and Kavanaugh noted above**-had
routinely departed from the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize statutory
political questions.49
45. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1428; see supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text (outlining these
rationales).
46. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1428; see id. at 1435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing with this
position). Likewise, there is no exclusive commitment to the executive to interpret federal
statutes in nonconstitutional cases. Cf Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (explaining that a court's holding that a statute has an
unambiguous meaning trumps a contrary interpretation by an administrative agency).
47. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1430.
48. See supra note 7.
49. See supra notes 23, 26.
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B. Vindicating the Separation ofPowers
Scholars and courts agree that the political question doctrine arises
"primarily [as] a function of the separation of powers."50 But that concept
requires further definition. When the Court has invoked the separation of
powers in political question cases, it has referred to the separation between the
judicial branch and one of the political branches. For example, in Nixon v. United
States, the Court refused to second-guess the Senate's procedures for exercising
its "sole Power to try all Impeachments."5' By contrast, the Court has
consistently adjudicated cases involving the separation of powers between the
legislative and executive branches. Indeed, some of the most significant decisions
in constitutional law fall into this category." Moreover, the Court's role as the
ultimate tiebreaker between the political branches helps sustain the
constitutional order.53
The distinction between these meanings of "separation" derives from
structural constitutional principles. As Judge Kavanaugh insightfully observed,
the political question doctrine operates asymmetrically in favor of the
executive.54 When a court dismisses a claim as nonjusticiable, the defendant
wins and the status quo prevails. By definition, when the claim alleges the
executive's failure to comply with a statute, the result is that "Congress is
unable to constrain Executive conduct in the challenged sphere of action."s
This outcome raises troubling implications, especially in the field of
national security, where the Constitution distributes power among both
so. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962); Barkow, supra note 14, at 335 ("The doctrine strikes
at the heart of the separation of powers and the need for each branch to stay within its
sphere to maintain the constitutional order.").
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 3, cl. 6; Nixon v. United States, 5o6 U.S. 224 (1993).
52. E.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988);
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926).
53. See RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 162 (2001) (invoking a "reverse political question
doctrine" to justify judicial intervention rather than abstention in cases of constitutional or
national crisis). For a contrary perspective, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not
Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093, 1109 (2001).
54. See EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F- 3d 836, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
5s. Id. at 857.
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political branches.s' By systematically favoring the executive over the
legislature, statutory political questions enable executive lawlessness and
destabilize what Justice Jackson termed "the equilibrium established by our
constitutional system."" It is important to recognize, however, that the rule
against statutory political questions does not imply that Congress can always
constrain the President. If a statute invades a constitutional power committed
exclusively to the executive, the court should invalidate the law-as the
Supreme Court has done in several landmark cases,s8 and as the D.C. Circuit
did with respect to § 214 (d) on remand.5 9 Conversely, if Congress enacted the
statute validly, the court must enforce the law against the President.60 But in
each scenario, the separation of powers requires adjudicating the merits. As
Zivotofsky put it, "[e]ither way, the political question doctrine is not
implicated.""
C. Advancing Prudential Objectives
Judicial opponents of statutory political questions have relied primarily on
doctrinal and structural constitutional arguments. But prudential
56. Compare U.S. CONsT. art. I, 5 8 (providing Congress with powers to "define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations
... declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water . .. raise and support Armies ... [and] provide and maintain a
Navy"), with U.S. CONsT. art. II, §5 2, 3 (providing the President with powers to "be
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy .. . make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur ... appoint Ambassadors ... [and] receive Ambassadors and other
public ministers"). See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POwER AFrER THE IRAN-CoNTRA AFFAIR 69 (1990) ("[G]enerally speaking, the
foreign affairs power of the United States is a power shared among the three branches of the
national government.").
57. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring). To situate this Comment's argument
within Justice Jackson's classic tripartite framework, see id. at 635-38, the flaw with statutory
political questions is that they improperly shift cases from Category Three, in which the
executive takes action "incompatible with the .. . will of Congress" and finds its power at
"its lowest ebb," into Category Two, in which presidential power is evaluated against a
backdrop of congressional silence, see id.
58. E.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
59. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
6o. E.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (20o6); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579.
61. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2012).
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considerations also bolster this position."* Consider the practical consequences
of dismissing a statutory claim like Zivotofsky's. On the one hand, if the
statutory constraint is constitutional but the claim is dismissed, the court has
sanctioned executive defiance of a valid statute, thus contradicting the
foundational principle that no President stands above the law.3 On the other
hand, if the statute is unconstitutional and the claim is dismissed, the
unconstitutional law remains on the books "like a loaded weapon ready for the
hand" of future executives to abuse.64
Even presuming the good faith of public officials, statutory political
questions deprive the government of valuable guidance by failing to demarcate
the boundaries of each branch's authority. As Justice Kennedy noted at the
Zivotofsky oral argument, avoiding the merits of statutory claims invites "the
specter of constant legislative determinations that are not clearly" on either side
of the constitutional line.6 s Paradoxically, a doctrine designed to constrain
judicial discretion"6 can yield broader and less transparent decisions than
merits holdings. Statutory political questions thus represent a form of false
modesty, professing judicial restraint but producing judicial abdication.
Government actors are not the only ones who suffer when courts find
statutory political questions. The litigant whose claim is dismissed loses his or
her day in court. This problem is especially acute given the prominent role of
statutes as a source and a vehicle for individuals to vindicate fundamental
rights.6 7 Of course, some claims dismissed as political questions would not
have prevailed on the merits. But procedural justice-the understanding that
62. For an elaboration of doctrinal, structural, and prudential modalities of constitutional
argument, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 1-8
(1982).
63. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).
64. Cf Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (coining
the phrase to describe the risks created by a misguided judicial precedent).
65. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) (No. 10-699).
66. See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 27, at 40 (characterizing the doctrine as exemplifying a "passive
virtue[]").
67. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN A. FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMEICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 5 (2oo) (noting that "statutes commonly provide positive
rights to people, providing them with legal means to combat oppression and
discrimination"); Access to Courts, supra note I, at 1193-98.
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the legitimacy of a legal system depends on litigants' rights to have their claims
heard-demands merits adjudication when possible.6 8
Moreover, because a political question holding stamps a claim as unsuited
for judicial resolution, plaintiffs generally have no other forum in which to seek
redress. When courts dismiss common law or constitutional claims as political
questions, the disappointed parties may petition the legislature to recognize
their rights via statute. But when courts dismiss a statutory claim, injured
plaintiffs have nowhere to turn.6 9 Prudential considerations counsel against
delivering such a far-reaching disposition without considering the merits -
particularly when the claimant asserts a right conveyed through the democratic
process of statutory enactment.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has advocated a straightforward proposition: a federal
statutory claim can never present a political question. The rule against
statutory political questions builds on Zivotofsky's reasoning and arguments
articulated by Judges Edwards and Kavanaugh in earlier separate opinions.
The proposal extends beyond any previous scholarly or judicial position by
applying the rule to all statutory cases - and by defending it based on a
combination of doctrinal, structural, and prudential grounds.
Ultimately, the most important implications of this Comment's proposal
transcend judicial practice. Rejecting statutory political questions redeems the
deep structural premises of American democracy. By preventing courts from
circumventing the legislature's ability to constrain the executive, the rule
proposed in this Comment would reinforce the principle that "the Constitution
diffuses power the better to secure liberty."70 It would provide plaintiffs a
forum to vindicate the rights that their elected representatives have created.
68. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 26, 26-27 (2007). See
generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw (2oo6) (elaborating the theory of
procedural justice).
69. By depriving the plaintiff of an alternative forum, the political question doctrine differs
sharply from other forms of judicial abstention, which leave state courts open to plaintiffs
whose claims are dismissed in federal court. The analogy between the political question
doctrine and these other forms of abstention in Justice Sotomayor's concurrence thus rests
on a faulty premise. See Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1434 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
70. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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And it would ensure, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, that our
constitutional system reflects a "government of laws, and not of men."71
CHRIS MICHEL
71. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
* I thank the editors of the Yale Law Journal, especially Andrew Hammond, for their superb
insights and advice. Thanks also to my professor and mentor, Judge Brett Kavanaugh, who
taught the seminar that inspired this Comment. And, as always, thanks to my wife Emily
and daughter Abigail for their unfailing love and support.
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